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 Conflict and political instability continue to characterise African states and global trends point 
toward the devolution of the responsibility for conflict management from the United Nations 
(UN) to regional and sub-regional levels. This poses a significant challenge to sub-regional se-
curity arrangements such as the Southern African Development Community Organ for Politics 
Defence and Security Co-operation (SADC OPDSC). This article resists the temptation to submit 
to OPDSC-pessimism in view of the failures of the Organ since its inception. Instead it focuses 
on the immediate short-term challenges as opportunities to be exploited through a partnership 
between the public and private sector with the active involvement of civil society and the inter-
national community. In particular, it emphasises the need for a clear, institutionalised, policy 
framework that will allow the sub-regional security system to operate (relatively) free from po-
litical interference by ruling elites and in the interest of all the citizens of Southern Africa. 
 
At the dawn of the third millennium conflict and political instability continue to characterise 
African states and global trends point toward the devolution of the responsibility for conflict 
management from the United Nations (UN) to regional and sub-regional levels. This poses a 
significant challenge to sub-regional security arrangements such as the Southern African Devel-
opment Community Organ for Politics Defence and Security Co-operation (SADC OPDSC, 
hereafter referred to as OPDSC or the Organ) [1]. 
Not since the height of Apartheid destabilisation of the region in the mid-1980s has there 
been such an urgent need for the establishment of a security arrangement that takes into 
account not only security from threats, but also security from want for the people of Southern 
Africa. However, the local and global environments in which the thirteen states that make up 
the Southern African Development Community [2] search for peace and security has changed 
considerably since the 1980s. The long-standing civil wars in Mozambique and Angola have 
come to an end; Namibia has gained independence; the oppressive Apartheid regime in South 
Africa has been replaced by a nascent democracy; and a conflict that erupted in the Democra-
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tic Republic of the Congo in 1998 continues to simmer. At the international level, the fall of 
the Berlin war in 1990 brought an end to the Cold War bipolar global security structure expos-
ing hitherto hidden ethnic and geographic divides between and within states; the international 
capitalist system is flourishing and is rewarding fast-growing industrial economies leaving be-
hind those that are struggling to emerge from the havoc wreaked by colonialism, socialism and 
war; China is emerging as a considerable economic and military entity; and the ‘war on terror’ 
dominates the international security agenda – often at the expense of pressing demands for 
United Nations attention to conflicts and humanitarian disasters in Africa and other develop-
ing nations. 
Cognisant of these realities and the need to create a safe and secure environment in which 
accelerated development can take place, the leaders of Southern Africa have embarked upon 
efforts to revive and transform existing collective security arrangements amongst them and 
agree upon further mechanisms to this effect. But, the search for a common sub-regional agen-
da for peace, human security and conflict management has encountered a number of obstacles 
along the way and further challenges abound. 
This article resists the temptation to submit to OPDSC-pessimism in view of the failures of 
the Organ since its inception. Instead it focuses on the immediate short-term challenges as 
opportunities to be exploited through a partnership between the public and private sector with 
the active involvement of civil society and the international community. In particular, it 
emphasises the need for a clear, institutionalised, policy framework that will allow the sub-
regional security system to operate (relatively) free from political interference by ruling elites 
and in the interest of all the citizens of Southern Africa. 
Security and security systems 
In the 1990s the security debate shifted towards the recognition of a concept of ‘human securi-
ty’ as a counter-balance to mere state- and/or regime security. Human security places the indi-
vidual at the centre of security and emphasises not only freedom from threat, but also the need 
for economic, social and political security of the individual. However, since the terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001 there has been a return to neo-conservatism 
and the militarisation of security on a global scale. This has seen a resurgence of the debate on 
the merits of human security versus state security that will not be discussed at length in this 
article [3]. In the context of this article, the assumption is that the challenge is not a choice 
between the two perspectives, but rather the need to achieve the right balance between human 
and military security in the Southern African region. 
In the Protocol establishing the SADC Organ there are a number of references which im-
plicitly recognise the importance of an approach to security that emphasises the security of 
people and the non-military dimensions of security [4]. Amongst other in the preamble, where 
heads of state acknowledge that ‘peace, security and strong political relations are critical factors 
in creating a conducive environment for regional co-operation and integration’; Article 2, 2(g) 
where they commit themselves to ‘promote the development of democratic institutions and 
practices within the territories of State Parties and encourage the observance of universal hu-
man rights…’; and, Article 2, 2(i) that highlights the need to ‘promote a community based 
approach to domestic security’ [5]. 
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As they are inextricably linked, the conceptual framework for the Organ should be read in 
conjunction with the Treaty establishing SADC [6]; the founding documents of the African Uni-
on (AU) [7] and in particular the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) [8] 
and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) 
[9]; the framework document of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) [10]; 
and the principles of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) [11], which all acknowledge 
that developmental and integration goals/objectives need to be reconciled with the tasks of 
conflict prevention, conflict management, peacekeeping, and even, at times, peace enforce-
ment. 
The logical conclusion from these linkages between security and development would be 
the creation of a ‘security community’ in the Southern African region. Common security refers 
to a stage beyond the recognition of shared security interests towards the inculcation of shared 
norms and values. It furthermore dictates the need for aligning each and every country’s do-
mestic policy and behaviour with that of the community, implying a degree of ‘loss of sover-
eignty’ that is dependent upon a high level of mutual trust within the grouping of states. 
While there is a recognised need for the creation of a security community in Southern 
Africa and numerous agreements are being concluded to this effect, such a community does 
not yet exist in the region. Many argue that while the legal basis exists in treaties and protocols, 
the political will to fully implement these arrangements lacks behind [12]. What currently exists 
in the region can at best be described as a collaborative or co-operative security regime charac-
terised by instruments such as a mutual defence pact (that will be discussed in some detail later 
in the article) and a number of weak institutions aimed at identifying shared security interests. 
As SADC moves to a common security system, a number of institutional, conceptual, and 
other challenges need to addressed in a systematic and sustainable manner. 
Developments in the Southern African security architecture 
Since the signing of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security (hereafter referred to 
as the Protocol) in Blantyre in 2001, a number of significant developments have taken place. 
According to the Protocol the OPDSC is placed under the authority of the SADC Summit; is led 
by a leadership Troika (consisting of an outgoing, current and incoming chairperson [13]) that 
rotates on an annual basis and does not overlap with the leadership Troika of SADC itself [14]; 
will be provided with secretarial services by the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone; and will consist 
of a number of structures and sub-structures. As will be discussed in more detail further on in 
this article, the subsequent restructuring process is as yet incomplete. 
While, theoretically, the Protocol resolves the impasse over the position of the Organ vis-
à-vis the other institutions of regional integration in SADC, some issues remain to be resolved 
in the process of implementing the provisions of the Protocol. The tension between the milita-
ry-security establishment on the one hand and the foreign policy-conflict management com-
munity on the other is not resolved in practical terms. 
In principle the Protocol appears to affirm a conflict management regime that favours pol-
itical, rather than military solutions [15]. It establishes an Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy 
Committee (ISPDC) to counterbalance the long-standing and powerful Inter-State Defence and 
Security Committee (ISDSC) [16], and contains specific references to the need for political co-
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operation and the promotion of democratic institutions and practices. In reality, however, the 
ISPDC has only met twice and has not yet set up any sub-committees. 
The ISPDC is composed of ministers responsible for foreign affairs from SADC member 
states while the ISDSC consists of ministers responsible for defence, public security and state 
security. The Ministerial Committee of the Organ, responsible for the coordination of the 
work of the Organ and its structures, is composed of all the above ministers. The implication is 
that ministers will have to report to themselves on a next level, an arrangement which may 
effectively render the Committee obsolete since the ISPDC and ISDSC may in certain circum-
stances also report directly to the Chairperson of the Organ. As Cedric de Coning argues [17], 
this ‘create(s) a dangerous dualism by splitting the Political and Diplomatic Committee from 
the military, public security and state security interest of the ISDSC’. As such the problem of 
differences amongst member states in the preference for either diplomatic or military solutions 
to problems in the region is not addressed through the restructured Organ. 
As if to re-affirm the perception that SADC states continue to shy away from the domestic 
implications of closer political co-operation, the Organ prioritised the finalisation of a Mutual 
Defence Pact (MDP) [18]. The Pact was subsequently adopted at the SADC Summit in Dar es 
Salaam in August 2003. A watered-down version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) Pact which obliges members to respond to an attack on a member state as an attack on 
all, the MDP merely calls upon member states to ‘participate in such collective action in any 
manner it deems appropriate’ [19]. More worryingly, it recommits states to the principle of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of any of its members and opens the door for collective 
action in support of a non-democratic regime [20]. 
The current year and 2005 sees the majority of SADC states going to the polls, and encour-
agingly, SADC states have agreed on a number of principles to guide the holding of ‘free and 
fair’ elections in the region. The SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elec-
tions [21], adopted by Heads of State during their Summit in Mauritius in August 2004, con-
tains brief reference to some principles for the conduct of democratic elections and then 
elaborates on the mandate and constitution of the SADC Observer Mission, guidelines for ob-
servers and their rights and obligations. Unfortunately they come a bit late as South Africa and 
Malawi have already held their elections and elections in Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe will be held in the next six months, leaving little time for these states 
to amend their electoral policies where required and for the preparation of mechanisms to sup-
port a SADC Observer Mission. The guidelines also fail to go beyond the actual election period 
to include the critical run-up phase during which much is determined in terms of the ‘environ-
ment’ in which elections will be taking place. A further critique of the guidelines points out 
that while the country holding elections may choose to invite the SADC Observer Mission, they 
are not compelled to do so; that there are no particular guidelines for the composition of the 
Observer Mission other than that it will be constituted by the Chairman of the Organ; and 
there are no punitive measures to be employed against a state which fails to comply with these 
guidelines. 
Both the MDP and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections 
thus, for the time being, remain paper tigers along with so many other Protocols and Agree-
ments signed by Southern African leaders. 
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Challenges of implementation 
In 2001 the Ministerial Committee of the Organ, in line with instructions by the Summit, em-
barked upon the development of a regional Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO). 
After many delays the SIPO was finally adopted by SADC heads of state at their summit in Dar 
es Salaam in 2003 and officially launched by the then chairperson of the Organ, the prime 
minister of Lesotho, at the August 2004 Summit in Mauritius. While certainly indicative, the 
plan still lacks clear guidelines for implementation, and remains to be integrated into SADC’s 
more general Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) [22]. In the meantime, 
progress will be limited and ad hoc until the restructuring process of SADC is completed and 
the SADC Secretariat is fully staffed in order to be able to carry out its extensive mandate. 
An incomplete restructuring process 
The first and foremost challenge to the implementation of all of SADC’s regional agreements is 
the conclusion of the lingering restructuring process [23]. With regard to peace and security 
issues, this includes the establishment of all the committees and sub-committees envisaged in 
the Protocol and in particular, a department of politics and security at the SADC Secretariat and 
a conflict management unit including an early warning system and training capacity. At present, 
there are only two individuals at the Secretariat with a mandate to deal with issues of peace and 
security. 
According to the SADC Treaty [24] and Article 9 of the Protocol, the SADC Secretariat is 
responsible for providing services to the OPDSC. As an interim measure, the country chairing 
the Organ has been providing secretarial and administrative support. This arrangement has 
created problems of continuity and institutional memory that will have to be addressed at the 
earliest possible stage through the creation of relevant processes and policies to manage the 
transfer of control to the Secretariat. A recent decision to establish an ‘Office of the Chair-
person’ (under the guise of it being a measure to assist ‘weaker’ member states to execute their 
duties) as an additional SADC-supported structure may further delay the transfer of the ‘Organ 
Secretariat’ to its rightful place in Gaborone. Keeping the administrative body responsible for 
issues of security separate from the one that manages regional integration in the economic and 
social spheres does not bode well for the institutionalisation of a human security perspective in 
the sub-region. The current arrangement furthermore creates the danger that the Organ agenda 
is vulnerable to manipulation by the Chair or other political interests in the region. 
Regional dynamics and the lack of domestic security 
Despite much progress, Southern Africa remains plagued by instability and conflict. The peace 
process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is threatened by continued violence in 
the east of that vast country and political instability in Zimbabwe continues to escalate. Angola 
is still faced by a myriad of problems pertaining to post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilita-
tion in a country destroyed by 27 years of virtually uninterrupted war. 
To date SADC has failed to respond to the conflict in the DRC in a coordinated manner. 
The military intervention, on behalf of the government, of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe 
into the conflict in 1998 was neither mandated, nor rejected by SADC – amounting to a de facto 
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approval thereof. On the other hand, the political and diplomatic efforts of, in particular 
Zambia, Tanzania, and South Africa, have not enjoyed SADC’s broad-based support either. 
Efforts by erstwhile chairs of the Organ, Mozambique and Lesotho, to convene a SADC task 
force to visit the Congo have failed repeatedly. Neither has the DRC formally requested SADC 
as such to assist in its peacemaking and peacebuilding process. 
The case of the DRC is illustrative of the ideological divisions that continue to characterise 
the region. On the one side there is the militarist block dominated by Angola and Zimbabwe, 
and on the other we find those who prefer political and diplomatic options for conflict man-
agement led by South Africa and Mozambique. Other states are aligned to either block or have 
opted to sit on the fence. 
Angola is an undisputed military giant in the region and with its abundant combination of 
diamonds and oil has the potential to rise to considerable economic significance as well. As 
such, a coordinated SADC programme of action to assist in peace building and post-conflict 
reconstruction at all levels in Angola ought to be a regional priority. The OPDSC, as the SADC 
structure with primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the region, 
has an important role to play in this regard. 
The Zimbabwean situation is a little trickier and presents an instance of a lack of political 
stability, rather than open violent conflict as in the case of the DRC. If the concept of political 
stability is expanded to include principles of ‘good governance’, as implied by the Protocol, 
even more countries would fail to make the cut. With due consideration for the developments 
on the continental level [25], the implication of the Zimbabwean situation is to compound the 
urgency of the need for the region to develop and agree upon a set of minimum standards of 
good governance (such as, fewer restrictions on press freedoms, freedom of association, and 
the like) and create a sub-structure to carry out reviews. This needs to be supplemented by the 
design of a mechanism to deal with signatories who do not comply with these minimum 
standards [26]. The Organ should, at the same time, set in motion the necessary processes for 
the establishment of a sub-committee on democracy and human rights under the ISPDC. The 
adoption of the abovementioned SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic 
Elections is a step in the right direction, but there is a long way to go. 
In the absence of clear external threats to peace and security in Southern Africa, the lack 
of domestic security presents the gravest challenge. John Dzimba [27] argues that the fact that 
most of the threats to the security of people Southern Africa derive from internal, rather than 
external factors paradoxically represents an advantage – it places the region’s destiny in its own 
hands. Most security threats, particularly within states, are non-military [28], and a holistic 
approach to addressing these issues needs to overshadow any military considerations. At pres-
ent Angola and Zimbabwe are the most daunting examples, but human security is not a given 
in the majority of countries in the region. Close to 50% of SADC’s population live on less than 
a dollar a day, few people can expect to reach the age of 50, and HIV/AIDS is rampant. Such 
extreme levels of depravation create a breeding ground for political mobilisation, ethnic rivalry 
and religious extremism, especially if compounded by a lack of mechanisms to ensure the equi-
table distribution of resources through legitimate political processes. This points to a need for 
ever-closer co-operation between SADC itself and the OPDSC and also calls for the active in-
volvement of civil society, the private sector and the international community in the Organ’s 
initiatives. Consultation processes with the aforementioned groups ought to be institutional-
ised, and perhaps a sub-structure needs to be created to this effect. 
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The need for conceptual clarification [29] 
A number of issues and concepts within the Protocol, the Organ, and the collective memory of 
southern African states beg for clarification. The issue of continued conflict of political values 
amongst states in the region finds its way into almost all explanations of the failure of the 
OPDSC and discussions of the challenges to the future of the Organ. Finding common ground 
is a matter of extreme urgency [30] that would require open and honest dialogue comple-
mented by a free flow of information and due consideration for the domestic conditions of 
different states. 
Certain aspects of the SADC Protocol are ambiguous and may lead to disputes on the basis 
of divergent interpretations if conceptual clarity is not achieved through additional consultation 
and, where necessary, agreements and amendments to the Protocol. Brief mention may be 
made of the apparent negligence to consider instances where conflicts do not conform to 
either the traditional definition of an inter- or an intra-state conflict, but where the lines are 
blurred (such as the DRC). The mechanisms for dealing with inter-state war, as entrenched in 
the UN system and replicated in regional and sub-regional organisations, are not appropriate 
for resolving such conflicts, and the appropriateness of intervention into the internal affairs of 
a state appears to be judged post hoc and on political, rather than legal grounds at this point in 
time. The OPDSC will have to clarify these issues in the regional context and agree upon 
decision-making and substantive procedures to be institutionalised. 
It is also necessary that the SADC and the OPDSC in particular obtain clarity as to the level 
of integration desired within the region as this has far-reaching implications. 
Another potential source of contention in need of clarification is the exact use of, and 
meaning attached to, collective security and collective defence. Else, as Anthoni van Nieuw-
kerk warns [31], the Organ may remain ‘an instrument in the hands of state elites who will use 
it to protect and advance their interests…The distinction between the two is crucial. The 
former is based on political and security protocols and co-operation, whilst the latter entails a 
more ambitious commitment by states to defend each other against external attack’. 
Linking SADC’s security architecture to continental developments 
As mentioned earlier, Southern Africa’s security architecture is inextricably linked to develop-
ments at the continental and international level. In the year 2002 the OAU was transformed into 
the AU and, in recognition of the fact that economic growth and human development cannot 
take place amid war and violent conflict, its mandate to work towards peace and stability on 
the continent was reiterated and reinforced. The Protocol establishing the AU Peace and Secu-
rity Council (PSC) [32] was signed by African Heads of State and entered into force on 26 De-
cember 2003. While not all that much different from the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Preven-
tion, Management and Resolution in its principles and objectives, the PSC seems to be regarded 
with much more seriousness by decision-makers within and outside the region. The trend to 
delegate peacemaking, -keeping, -enforcement and -building activities to the regional level 
appears irreversible and African leaders’ desire to seek ‘African solutions to African problems’ 
acts as a further driver. While the guiding principles of the PSC still respect the sovereignty of 
member states, it now enjoys the right to ‘intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision 
of the assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity’ [33]. 
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Another relevant development at the continental level include the reaffirmation (through 
the adoption of a relevant Memorandum of Understanding signed in this regard in 2002) of the 
core values, commitments and performance indicators contained in the Conference on Securi-
ty, Stability, Development, and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) [9]. 
Also significant is the commencement of voluntary country reviews of economic and 
political governance by the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) [10]. 
While the horizontal relationship between these different continental mechanisms remains 
to be resolved, there is also a need to explore the vertical linkages between these continental 
structures and sub-regional entities such as SADC. Southern Africa should create the capacity to 
contribute to the African Standby Force, the continental Early Warning System, and should 
replicate the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) at the sub-regional level to assess the 
progress of member states in terms of ‘good’ political and economic governance. There is 
considerable pressure on sub-regional entities to sign Memoranda of Understanding with the 
AU to cement their role as building blocks of the continental security arrangements, but SADC 
needs to clarify its own objectives and structures first (informed of course by continental 
requirements) to be able to enter into such negotiations from a position of certainty and 
strength. 
Other immediate challenges 
The issue of funding presents another major challenge. SADC is financed by equal contributions 
from member states, and donations. In order to operate as envisaged, the SADC OPDSC needs a 
sustainable source of revenue. Already cash-strapped member states may not be able to pro-
vide sufficient contributions to maintain a permanent secretariat, a peacekeeping training cen-
tre and other standing sub-committees, and reservations with regard to relying upon donor 
funding are justified. Various options for funding both within the entire SADC structure and in-
dependently need to be explored. Beyond the institutional requirements of the Organ, the issue 
of funding has implications for broad overall capacity and will specifically affect the capacity of 
the OPDSC to coordinate and accept delegated conflict management responsibilities. 
Communication and information sharing represents a historical challenge [34] that could 
remain an impediment to coordination and integration if it is left unaddressed. Communiqués 
issued at the end of meetings have been blunt working instruments, not allowing much insight 
into what really transpired [35]. This effectively excluded not only independent analysts, civil 
society and national constituencies from participation, but even kept average SADC ministers 
and officials in the dark. This unhealthy state of affairs was compounded by the fact that SADC 
did not have a functioning website until recently, and that even official legal documents (i.e. 
protocols and treaties) were difficult to get hold of. There is a need for the OPDSC to change 
this situation, use the Secretariat to accurately record all meetings, including Summits, in order 
to avoid divergent readings, act as an institutional memory and vehicle for continuity, and 
allow for the broad participation of civil society and other stakeholders while ensuring transpa-
rency and accountability. Attention to these kinds of issues should also bode well for relations 
with the international donor community. 
Training and capacity building should take place at various levels within the SADC OPDSC 
structures. Extending from training the secretariat and SADC diplomats to the creation of an ef-
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ficient and credible regional peacekeeping force and community level (peace) education, these 
activities should form a part of the core functions of the Organ, and might be overseen by a 
special representative or various subcommittees. The OPDSC should also consider involving 
civil society capacity in these efforts. 
Conclusion 
These challenges highlight some of the issues that will be faced by the proponents and drivers 
of the SADC OPDSC in the near future. They are by no means exhaustive or representative of 
the complexity of the challenge of creating a well-functioning sub-regional security community. 
Only a few examples of those exist in the world. 
Once the main problem, that of gathering sufficient political will has been overcome, sys-
tematic and consultative efforts at confronting the remaining challenges should yield positive 
outcomes. 
The global climate is characterised to a large extent by contraction and a loss of faith in 
international structures as the principal providers of security and well-being. This presents an 
environment that encourages regional integration and rewards political stability, good gover-
nance and fiscal responsibility. 
With regard to security co-operation in Southern Africa, windows of opportunity have 
been missed in the past. At the advent of a new era in African affairs another opportunity is 
knocking, and there is justifiable cause for optimism that this time around the time is ripe for 
inclusive co-operation around the concept of human security that will improve the lives of all 
the people in Southern Africa. 
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